From: L' Ermit (lhermit@hotmail.com)
Date: Wed Feb 06 2002 - 19:58:58 MST
[Hermit 1] Perhaps you meant "3 options"? I'd suggest that there are more.
[Richard Ridge 2] No, two. Of the three presented the final course is,
frankly, not worthy of consideration. I should probably have said
'worthwhile options.' As for your further recommendations, I'd suggest that
your proposal is in essence a (logical) extension of option number one.
[Hermit 2] Got you, I think. I don't object to the division being
characterized as "1) Terminate sanctions", "2) Defeat and rebuild" and "3)
Status quo." In which case, I agree that I am proposing an elaboration of 1.
Is that fair?
<Prev snip>
[Hermit 1] Requiring some other nation or nations to put their soldiers at
risk and undoubtedly causing the deaths of more civilians.
[Richard Ridge 2] Indeed, although it can hardly be guaranteed that the
prospect of a resurgent Iraqi military might not have precisely the same
consequences for other states within the region or for much of the Iraqi
populace. Also, I have to agree with Joe - what you have prepared is in
essence a worst case scenario, which could easily come to pass, but that
would not necessarily be the case. I'm not sure why an arrangement of the
kind used in Afghanistan could not be used in this case (we will obviously
have to wait to see how well the new Afghan government copes, but the basic
principles seem far from unreasonable).
[Hermit 2] Keep an eye on the discussion with Joe. I have a number of
problems with this formulation:
[Hermit 2.1] It appears illegal (at present - that could change), but the US
does not appear to be worried by illegality anymore than they are of others
paying for their decisions.
[Hermit 2.2] I am very unconvinced that Iraq will pose a threat to any of
its neighbors in the conceivable future. While I would be amazed to discover
that they did not have the volition, I just don't see the delivery capacity
and have [i]never[/i] seen the will.
[Hermit 2.3] I am not yet convinced that any military intervention has had a
long-term beneficial effect - even though I do freely acknowledge that some
situations simply require it, no matter what our doubts are, and that I see
more not fewer interventions being desirable irrespective of the long
term-consequences. I am simply suggesting that we need to put in place
appropriate law (rather than relying on force majeure), and structures to
avoid the negative repercussions (I don't think it is impossible, just that
we haven't done it yet).
[Hermit 2.4] As noted in the parallel Joe thread, I am extremely skeptical
of the long-term prognosis for Afghanistan, based on the current structure
and situation. There is undoubtedly going to be a long term need for
intervention and monitoring, and I would suggest that even at the recent
height of international attention, that no nation demonstrated either the
will or intent to engage at the level required to prevent a reversion to
inequity and terror in the near future. I also see the high-handed
abrogation of law on the part of the allies, and the almost complete absence
of Al Q'aeda prisoners as being indicative of future trouble.
[Hermit 2.5] In my opinion, I'm not taking a worst-case view at all. Those
scenarios are really horrible. I am attempting to predict the future on a
mix of past and present behavior by the principle participants. I don't see
any other way of making "good" predictions. And preparing for "bad-news" and
rejoicing at good news is far less harmful than the reverse.
[Hermit 1] This almost certainly means working with Saddam Hussein and in
the long term, almost certainly having to provide him and his near
associates with guarantees of immunity. Personally, I would advocate that
this route be explored. Of course, having demonized Saddam Hussein for over
a decade...
[Richard Ridge 2] And vice versa... I'm not sure he's likely to want to
start working with the evil imperialists he's been denouncing for so long.
That cuts both ways.
[Hermit 2] I don't think this is an insurmountable problem for him. It is
worth remembering how belligerent he managed to sound (internally) even
while he was attempting to negotiate for peace (externally). I don't like
the man, don't like what he does and don't like how he does it. But he does
know how to "manage" the perceptions of his populace.
[Richard Ridge 2] It was after all, the Iraqi regime who refused to
co-operate with UN weapons inspections, which hardly seems to denote any
great willingness to be co-operative in that regard.
[Hermit 2] They had reasons, which prima facia were not unreasonable or
unlawful (whatever we suspect their motivation to have been). What should
have happened was the setting out, in great detail (diplomats and lawyers
would hate it) exactly what was required of Iraq to lift sanctions - and to
have implemented that via a scrupulously fair, agreed process, with a means
of establishing resolution of disputes that did not imply storming away from
the table. Iraq has no reason to trust the US - and vice versa. A realistic
approach would recognize this, rather than attempting to bury it, and have,
as we do, have both sides spending as much time attempting to gain an
advantage in the process at the detriment of the population of Iraq and
reputation of the US.
[Richard Ridge 2] The other problem is what to do with the territories
currently covered by the no-fly zones. I don't think Hussein is likely to
want to cede autonomy to those regions, regardless of what concessions may
be proffered.
[Hermit 2] They won't. Neither will Turkey. Or Iraq. Or Syria. Or Armenia.
And to establish a viable Kurdistan will require Turkey, Syria or Armenia to
provide a corridor to either the Mediterranean (preferable) or the Black
Sea, or Iran to the Persian Gulf. This is highly unlikely, given the absence
of an historical precedent and the absolute criticality of the Kurdish
snow-melt as a water source to all those nations. Refer to
[url]http://www.kurdish.com/kurdistan/maps/[/url] for maps of the area.
[Hermit 2] Again we have an ethnic group that is loathed and discriminated
against by all of those in their environment, where competition for scarce
resources exacerbates differences, where cultural differences prevent
assimilation, and where a sad history of horror leaves a rich legacy for
future conflict - almost irrespective of whatever resolution is achieved in
the near term. This is why I see these people as another candidate for a
"global village" effort.
[Richard Ridge 2] Conversely, in the current climate the main advantage of
the Iraqi regime is that it is a good old fashioned military dictatorship
focused on realpolitik (not entirely unlike the regime in Pakistan); i.e.
the same qualities that caused the US to view Iraq as being far more
preferable to the feverishly devout Iran prior to the Gulf war should
arguably do so again.
[Hermit 2] Agreed. Realpolitik has to take that preference into account too,
no matter what the bleeding hearts (who often seem the most ruthless of all
when implementing their beliefs) think about it. Long and bitter experience
should have taught us that until the environment is improved, that almost
any action taken will result in a further deterioration of the situation.
Regards
Hermit
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