From: joedees@bellsouth.net
Date: Mon Feb 11 2002 - 23:48:21 MST
On 7 Feb 2002 at 22:50, L' Ermit wrote:
> [Hermit 6] Seeing as Joe Dees has not chosen to comment on the refutation,
> and caviliarly dismisses Mr Halliday, in the same way as he has attempted to
> dismiss my arguments, I will, in the following response, instead make use
> largely of
> [ur=http://papers.maxwell.af.mil/projects/ay1999/awc/99-149.pdf]"GULF WAR
> TERMINATION REVISITED", Stanley T. Kresge, Lt Col, USAF, April 1999[/url] a
> source provided by Joe Dees to refute his arguments and expose his
> resistance to facts even from sources which he has chosen to cite. This will
> be designated "GWT 6" to minimize the volume of necessary citations. It is
> perhaps important to notice that this is the thesis of a senior American
> officer with Desert Storm experience attending the Airforce College, and
> that his conclusions substantially match mine (refer page 27 cited below) -
> as do those of every other US officer with whom I have discussed this. No
> doubt Joe Dees would call them all US-haters as well. In order to further
> minimize the bulk of what we still be a long post, I will where possible,
> summarize portions of arguments. These will be flagged [HJS 6]. Naturally I
> would welcome alternative summations by Joe Dees should he disagree with my
> summations. As I perceive Joe Dees as having persistently attacked me rather
> than my arguments, I will not <snip> this, but will highlight where I
> perceive it has occurred and do my best to avoid responding. I will number
> all the points raised in this round as “6” as the highest sequence number
> used in previous postings was “5” and I intended to consolidate these
> previous posts into a single reply. So the last response from Joe Dees is
> [Joe Dees 6] and my rebuttal is [Hermit 6].
> [hr]
> [Hermit 6] In response to a query for comment on a devastating critique of
> US policy in Iraq posted in
> [url=http://forum.javien.com/XMLmessage.php?id=id::Jzg_MSV7-jx2G-SClm-IlOx-5udn0vyfeHFe]”Re:
> virus: Response to Joe Dees. "Is the US a Rogue Nation?"”, Joe Dees, Thu Feb
> 07, 2002 01:09 am[/url]
>
> [Joe Dees 6*] It's what I would expect from the former humanitarian aid
> coordinator for Iraq; it is in the interests of such people to have such
> regimes remain in place so that they can have jobs. One wonders why he is
> the *former* UN Iraqi HAC.
>
> [Hermit 6] This is an interesting group of invalid and misleading
> assertions.
> [list][Hermit 6] First Denis Halliday was not "the former humanitarian aid
> coordinator for Iraq", he is "the former UN Humanitarian Coordinator for
> Iraq" and as such was responsible for ensuring the effectiveness of UN
> humanitarian programs in Iraq. A rather different kettle of fish, from that
> which Joe Dees attempted to portray.
> [Hermit 6] Secondly Denis Halliday’s job, as he clearly put it, was to
> alleviate suffering amongst the population of Iraq within the parameters of
> the Resolutions passed by the UN pertaining to Iraq. A job in which the US
> earnestly hoped he would succeed. At least, that is what they kept saying in
> the UN. It should be noted that his position was at the Assistant
> Secretary-General level. Prior to that (mid 1994), Mr Halliday served as
> Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resources Management of the United
> Nations... better management, performance and development of some 15,000
> United Nations staff world-wide.
> [url]http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/halliday/bio.html[/url] Not a
> nobody.
> [Hermit 6] Thirdly, as Denis Halliday himself explained, he is the former
> director because he resigned after 34 years at the UN as he could not do his
> job under the conditions imposed by the US and in protest of the devastating
> effects of the sanctions program.[/list]
> [hr]
> Wrt [url=
> http://forum.javien.com/XMLmessage.php?id=id::Epqn2vR@-bPDZ-ozZC-8P6g-cyxkp1sX_Koo]”Re:
> virus: Response to Joe Dees. "Is the US a Rogue Nation?"”, Joe Dees, Wed Feb
> 06, 2002 10:51 pm[/url]
> [hr]
> [HJS 6] Joe Dees argues that Iraq should have ignored theft by Kuwait of
> it's oil resources amounting to 12% of Iraq production per day. Hermit
> responds by asking if the US would have ignored such theft by Mexico,
> supported by the USSR in the mid 1960s and suggests that the US would not
> have and thus Joe Dees' argument "strains credibility"].
>
> [Joe Dees 6] Only yours. You cannot dismiss or ignore the much greater
> incentives that Arabian peninsula conquest posed for such an aggrandizing
> individual. Well, I guess you can; you just did.
>
> [Hermit 6] Hermit notes that Joe Dees later argues "Not answering aggression
> is seen by Muslim fanatics as a weakness inviting further attack" yet here
> argues that Iraq should have ignored aggression and accuses Joe Dees of
> logical inconsistency.
>
> [Hermit 6] In addition, Joe Dees does not appear to be aware that Iraq was
> being pressed for payment of war-loans made by Kuwait during the Iraq-Iran
> war, while at the same time, in breach of previous agreements, Kuwait was
> flooding the world market with oil, causing a massive drop in oil-prices and
> heavily impacting Iraq's already beleaguered economy caused by that eight
> year war which had left 300,000 Iraqi dead. Iraq had excellent reasons to
> want to eliminate the "opposition tribe" in Kuwait. As Joe Dees has already
> acknowledged that the US erred in telling Iraq that they had no interest in
> such a conflict, Hermit accuses Joe Dees of logical inconsistancy when Joe
> Dees excuses the US actions as errors, but indictes Iraq's subsequent attack
> as demonstrating an intent to conquer its neighbors.
>
Does the logical phrase "it does not follow" mean anything to you? The errors in
communication that the US might have made vis-a-vis Iraq have nothing to do with
iraq's intent, aside from encouraging it; certainly they dis not modify it as to what it
indeed was - the intent to conquer Kuwait, and further, to continue down the Arabian
Peninsula. In fact, Hermit's info. regarding the war debt Iraq owed to Kuwait
furnishes it with another reason to embark on such a course. I accuse Hermit of not
knowing what logical inconsisEncy means.
>
> [hr]
> [HJS 6] Joe Dees acknowledges Kuwait's dirty hands and US complicity in the
> Iran-Iraq war, but argues that Iraq was worse.
>
> [Joe Dees 6] The troops on either side were not our own; we were pleased to
> see Iran and Iraq fighting each other, rather than spreading their
> Mordor-like regimes over their borders into the subversion and conquest of
> other less offensive-minded countries.
>
> [Hermit 6] Hermit asserts that this glee at mutual destruction sponsored by
> the US demolishes Joe Dees' arguments that the US is [i]better than[/i]
> Iraq/Saddam Hussein. Hermit further notes that Joe Dees has not shown that
> Iraq intended to [b]subvert and conquer[/b] her neigbors, or that her
> neighbors were [b]less offensive-minded[/b].
> [hr]
>
Not being dismayed that two fanatical regimes are at war with each other rather than
aggressing their more moderate neighbors is most definitely not in the same category
as BEING one of those fanatical regimes; it is light-years better.
>
> [HJS 6] Joe Dees argues again that as bad as Kuwait was, that Iraq was
> worse, and is requested by Hermit to sustain his assertion that "thousands"
> were "killed, kidnapped and vanished by the Iraqis"
>
> [Joe Dees 6] Tens of thousands of Kuwaiti civilians were killed in the Iraqi
> takeover, and another 7000 simply disappeared.
>
> [Hermit 6] Hermit notes that Joe Dees appears to be misinformed. The figures
> announced by Kuwait to Associated Press in 1999, by Duaij Anzi, manager of
> the Kuwaiti committee for war prisoners, in response to Bagdad's demand for
> international community pressure on Kuwait to release information on more
> than 1,150 Iraqis whom Baghdad claimed have been missing in Kuwait since the
> 1991 Persian Gulf War, spoke of 400 Kuwaitis killed by the Iraqi occupation
> forces and another 600 missing, believed taken hostage in Iraq. That's a
> total of 1,000 or so casualties in a population of about a million and a
> half (many Kuwaitis were away at the time of the invasion taking extended
> summer holidays) over a period of six months. The statement failed to
> mention the 100,000 Palestinians displaced by the Kuwait military after the
> war because of Palestinian support for Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. Perhaps
> tens of thousands disappeared, but if so, it seems that this was Kuwait's
> doing and not Bagdad's. Hermit accuses Joe Dees of exageration and bias.
>
The Palestinian decision to back the bloodthirsty Saddam was the palestinians' not
the US's; likewise, the decision to expel hostile Palestinian refugees within their
borders (hostile because they supported Kuwait's invader) likewise was not the US's,
but Kuwait's; it was also an eminently logical one, given the circumstances. It is
doubtful that any of the invading Iraqi forces who did not leave Kuwait survived when
they were repulsed by the coalition. There are differing figures as to how many
Kuwaitis are dead and missing. To criticize a country for expelling the allies of its
invaders is illogical, biased, and in poor taste.
>
> [hr]
> [HJS 6] Joe Dees expresses a wish for "true democracy, freedom of
> expression, civil and human rights, egalitarianism, religious tolerance, and
> mutual non-aggression in all those nations". And Hermit observes that these
> desireable ideals are unlikely in "economically and ecologically marginal
> tribal territories" and suggests that destroying infrastructure is not the
> way to achieve them.
>
> [Joe Dees 6] If a cancer begins to grow in a body, you excise it to allow
> the body to grow in a less carniverous fashion. When we didn't exercise
> deterrence over the development of the military-industrial complex in the
> third reich, we all know what ensued.
>
> [Hermit 6] I would suggest that there is a clear difference between Iraq and
> WW II Germany, including the fact that Iraq agreed to withdraw prior to the
> war, and was foiled by American anger fuelled by Kuwaiti propaganda, whereas
> Germany pursued a course of unlimited aggression.
>
I maintain that saddam's word has been shown to be worth about as much as his
magnanimity, that is, nothing, and the reason that Iraq's aggression was limited is
because the coalition limited it.
>
> [Hermit 6] I further suggest that there is no difference between Iraq
> "excising" the evil they claim to have seen in Kuwait and US determination
> to "excise" the evil they claim to see in Iraq except for the fact that the
> US attempts to excise the "evil" they think they see smacks more of butchery
> than surgery. Hermit supports his suggestion:
>
Iraq was not after excising evil in Kuwait, but after assimilating them; the war debt
owed could only be permanently cancelled in the event that Kuwait ceased to exist as
a sovereign nation, and such was indeed Iraq's intention, bugled the world over with
their annexation announcement.
>
> [GWT p27]
> [quote]The final issue is a moral one. Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson
> raise this concern in The Imperial Temptation. The authors soundly criticize
> the U.S. for creating enormous devastation and misery in Iraq and not
> following through with post-war reconstruction and aid.
> We have fastened upon a formula for going to war—in which American
> casualties are minimized and protracted engagements are avoided—that
> requires the massive use of American firepower and a speedy withdrawal
> from the scenes of destruction…. Its peculiar vice is that it enables us to
> go to war with far greater precipitancy than we otherwise might while
> simultaneously allowing us to walk away from the ruin we create without
> feeling a commensurate sense of responsibility. It creates anarchy and calls
> it peace. In the name of order, it wreaks havoc. It allows us to assume an
> imperial role without discharging the classic duties of imperial rule.
> Clearly, U.S. measures to overthrow Saddam constituted a substantial
> intervention in Iraqi internal affairs. The tragic consequences of that
> intervention and subsequent ‘hands off’ policy is an embarrassing, if not
> shameful chapter in U.S. history. There is a middle ground between
> non-intervention and total commitment to post-war involvement in the World
> War II model. Tucker and Hendrickson suggest “that had the United States
> refrained from destroying Iraq’s infrastructure and had it not called for
> the overthrow of Saddam by the people of Iraq, the weight of the obligation
> to reconstruct and rehabilitate would have been considerably lessened”. When
> the means are limited, so must be the objectives. The result will be a more
> predictable war termination with less risk of undesirable unintended
> consequences." [/quote]
> [hr]
>
I fully agree that we should have rebuilt Iraq, but not for Saddam to use against us.
The only way to both alleviate the sufferings of the Iraqi people and end the threat
that Saddam poses to the region and the world is to depose him prior to
reconstruction. That's what we should have done; luckiny, that error can still be
corrected.
>
> [HJS 6] Hermit draws a time-line of events reflecting that Iraq adopted a
> far from unreasonable stance and was countered by British and US demands
> that her ability to defend herself be removed. Joe Dees responds by
> asserting that the US was supported by the UN. Hermit responds that UN
> support shrank during the war and is completely lacking for the sanctions.
>
UN support only shrank by a few countries, mostly Islamic ones, during the war;
support for the sanctions is still quite strong, and is indeed the UN position presently.
>
> [Joe Dees 6] Petainism and Chaimberlainality in the face of aggression is
> sadly an all-to-frequent historical occurrence, as is the decision not to
> oppose naked aggression because money might be made with the aggressor. This
> happened with the US in the Vietnam war, with the USSR in the Afghanistan
> war, with China in the occupation of Tibet, and
> with Iraq in the Gulf war.
>
> [Hermit 6] Hermit suggests that Joe Dees’ response is irrelevant to the
> question and cites:
>
> [GWT p 8]
> [quote] Arab reaction to the killing of fellow Arabs had to be considered.
> On 24 January, the New York Times reported that the Egyptian public,
> “shocked by the force and breadth of the allied bombing” was becoming more
> sympathetic to Iraq. Three days later “the Egyptian government announced
> that it favored neither the destruction of Iraq nor the elimination of
> Saddam Hussein”. On 3 February, The New York Times reported the concern of a
> prominent Arab political scientist, Kamel Abu Jaber: “If the United States
> continues with what it’s doing…, there is no question that the region is in
> for a long period of terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, and terrific
> hatred”. Sensitive to the public opinion in their countries, Arab coalition
> partners, primarily Saudi Arabia and Egypt, were pressuring President Bush
> “to bring the fighting to an end quickly. The pressure from the Saudis had
> been especially intense”. Media reports of civilian casualties didn’t help
> matters. The 13 February raid on the “civilian air raid shelter” in Baghdad
> produced the New York Times headline, “Carnage in Baghdad Erases Image of an
> Antiseptic War”. Two days later the Times reported “that within the U.S.
> government the result of all the negative publicity was to increase pressure
> to step up the timing of the planned ground assault in an effort to bring
> the war to a speedy conclusion”. Arab reaction wasn’t the only issue.
> General Schwarzkopf recalls General Powell’s concern prior to the ceasefire:
> “He told me that in Washington the controversy over wanton killing had
> become uncomfortably intense—even the French and the British had begun
> asking how long we intended to continue the war.”
> [hr]
>
The so-called 'fury if the streets' is highly overrated; it subsided after Iraq was
defeated, just as it did when the Taliban were overthrown. We intended to continue
bombardment - and did - until we could mop up with ground forces with a minimum
anount of loss of life on our side. This is the way wars are fought and won - by
minimizing your own military casualties and, if necessary (and it often is) maximizing
your adversary's military casualties. By allowing the Republican guards to drive their
tanks back to Iraq to kill again (and they did), we violated this principle, and Shiites
and Kurds paid for this violation with their lives.
>
> [HJS 6] Joe Dees asserted that the US entered the conflict due to Saudi
> appeals for assistance. After Hermit had stated that an attack on Saudi
> Arabia was unlikely and that the Saudi Arabia had to be “persuaded” to
> accept US involvement.
>
> [Joe Dees 6] If an Iraqi push past Kuwait into Saudi Arabia had not been by
> all objective analysis extrtemely likely, the Saudis would have had more
> options. Perhaps we sold the situation a little strongly, but we didn't
> really have to; it was dire enough for them already. And not from us; from
> the Iraqis.
>
> [Hermit 6] I suggest that my unrefuted quotation “Iraq had already accepted
> Resolution 660, but believed that the US would attack them whatever they
> did” is sufficient counter to this claim. Iraq believed, and statements by
> Thatcher and Bush did not address this belief, that they were going to come
> under attack whether they withdrew or not. I would suggest that hindsight
> proves that Iraq was correct, which leaves a principle onus on the UK/US for
> the Gulf War and its sequel.
>
The fact is that there was no effort to withdraw before we attacked, and Iraq had six
months in order to do so. In addition, the annexation remained in place throughout.
Quite simply, Saddam Hussein is not to be believed, and we did not believe him.
> [hr]
> [HJS 6] Hermit cited numerous studies proving that the illegal US
> destruction of civilian infrastructure was deliberate and planned, including
> the consequent civilian casualties and that providing water purification and
> sewage treatment is desperately required for humanitarian reasons. Joe Dees
> responded by asserting that the reason it had not been repaired was Saddam
> Hussein’s refusal to permit monitoring of such supplies or equipment because
> of his desire for martyrs. Hermit refuted this with assertions derived from
> his reading of an article similar to
> [url=http://forum.javien.com/XMLmessage.php?id=id::Jzg_MSV7-jx2G-SClm-IlOx-5udn0vyfeHFe]"Re:
> virus: Response to Joe Dees. "Is the US a Rogue Nation?", Hermit, Thu
> 2002-02-07 01:35[/url] as the same facts are cited placing the blame for the
> human disaster firmly on the US.
>
> [Joe Dees 6] I hope that he has a debate with the chief UN weapons inspector
> who was tossed out; they routinely found evidence of massive hurried moves
> when they sprang surprise inspections, leading him to conclude that the
> weapons and manufacturing equipment was being moved ahead of time, and that
> their inspections were no surprise, due to electronic monitoring by the
> iraqis, iraqi moles within their operation, or both.
>
> [Hermit 6] I accuse Joe Dees of an unresponsive reply, and note that this
> assertion fails to address the humanitarian disaster and instead raises the
> bogeyman of security issues and transgressions by Iraq in an attempt to
> misdirect attention from the humanitarian disaster caused by the US. It
> fails to mention that there are substantial reasons to doubt the veracity of
> the charges, particularly in the light of the US’ repeated blocking of
> attempts to investigate the matter by the Security Council. In any case it
> is irrelevant as the following citation confirms the charges this time from
> Joe Dees’ source:
>
Hermit did not respond to my assertions concerning Iraq's duplicity, as trumpeted by
Scott Ritter. Sanctions are to remain in place as long as conditions for them to be
withdrawn are not met in good faith; they were definitely not so met. This places the
blame for the continued presence of the sanctions clearly and uncontestably on the
person who could have acted to have them removed, and didn't; namely Saddam
hussein.
>
> [GWT p27]
> [quote]A Harvard Study Team report estimated “that infant and child
> mortality would increase by some 100 percent during the first year following
> the ceasefire, or by some 70,000, as a result of gastroenteritis, cholera,
> typhoid, and malnutrition, and many thousands more aged and infirm Iraqis
> almost certainly succumbed to the same causes.” In fairness, the Gulf War
> Air Power Survey argues that these estimates are high because they did not
> anticipate the “rapid resumption of electrical power in Iraq”. To some
> extent, Iraqi civilian casualties were an unfortunate by-product of failed
> U.S. efforts to effect an elusive desired end state.[/quote]
> [hr]
> [HJS 6] Hermit notes that the supplies required for water purification are
> not controlled (or “dual-use”) items.
>
> [Joe Dees 6] Whether or not something is LISTED as dual use often is a poor
> indicator of whether or not it actually CAN be used for nefarious secondary
> purposes. Chlorine is a prime example. Industrial water purifiers are
> another.
>
> [Hermit 6] I draw your attention to the fact that the equipment and
> chemicals are not controlled, that Iraq agreed to permit monitoring of their
> use, that they are needed for humanitarian reasons, that there absence is
> shown to have killed over half a million children under five and over a
> million in total, and that it is the US embargo on water purification
> supplies and equipment which is causing these deaths. Arguing that the goods
> [i]might[/i] be used for other purposes, when their absence [i]is[/i]
> causing deaths, is to adopt a slippery slope argument, which is always
> invalid. In addition, Article 54, “Protection of Objects Indispensable to
> the Civilian Population”, of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Convention
> of 1977 makes this denial of necessary items illegal, and those guilty of it
> are, by definition, guilty of genocide. So at best the US and Saddam Hussein
> (if the charges against him in regard to the Kurds) moral equivalents.
>
The person who is guilty of the genocide of his own people is Saddam Hussein, by
refusing to in good faith meet the conditions necessary for the sanctions to be lifted.
Period.
> [hr]
> [HJS 6] Joe Dees attempts to justify the deliberate targeting of civilian
> infrastructure. Hermit observes that this is illegal, that it has caused
> over 1 million civilian deaths and that it forms a “pattern of behavior” by
> the US as the same strategy has been used in previous conflicts.
>
The Iraqis devastated the Kuwaiti infrastructure before they left, and perpetuated an
ecological disaster by torching the entire Kuwiti oilfields. Civilian infrastructure is not
something I would attack, but if military resources are placed in close proximity to
such infrastructure in order to shield it from attack, then that strategy can not be
allowed to succeed.
>
> [Joe Dees 6] Actually, the strategy of infrastructure destruction was used
> before WW II; it was used during WW I and during the Japanese incursion into
> China. It was also used by the Nazis and the Fascists in Europe and North
> Africa, and by japan in the Phillipines. It's main purpose is to demoralize
> the population base of the enemy and thus sap their will to fight and to
> support their troops in the field, as well as to curtail the manufacture of
> both weapons and non-weapons support items for use by their troops. I think
> that such a policy might have worked against Japan (rather than dropping
> nuclear weapons), but it would have taken a long time and many more US lives
> (and maybe more Japanese lives).
>
> [Hermit 6] I will avoid responding to the assertions about Japan in WW II
> (although I disagree there too) as I raised this to show pattern, not to
> raise guilt. I will instead observe that the week before the end of the war
> the Red Crescent Society of Jordan estimated 113,000 civilian dead, 60% of
> them children. Elsewhere I have shown that by February 1991, the UN
> estimated that less than 5% of the water purification system survived, and
> that most of the sewage processing infrastructure had been destroyed. I have
> also shown that this was deliberate targeting by the US military with full
> knowledge of the anticipated result, and have confirmed this by reference to
> [GWT p27 Supra]. I further assert that this is illegal in terms of:
> [list]
> The Nuremberg Charter, which classed the "wanton destruction of cities,
> towns, or villages" as a Nuremberg War Crime.
> Articles 48, 51, 52, 54 and 55 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva
> Convention 1977 which forbids the deliberate targeting of civilians and
> infrastructure required to sustain civilian life.
> US Law, in as much as the US War Crimes Act of 1996 makes war crimes
> punishable in US federal courts, with penalties up to and including death.
>
Civilian infrastructure may have been targeted, mainly in cases where it was
suspected that this infrastructure had military applications (such as chemical
weapons manufacture or the storage of weapons), but the civilian population of Iraq
clearly was NOT targeted during the war. As to, the Red Crescent, it is well known
that many so-called humanitarian organizations the Islamic world over funnel monies
to terrorist organizations; I would not naively trust Red Crescent figures that possess
obvious propaganda value.
>
> [Hermit 6] I would further observe that the War Crimes tribunal has accused
> Slobodan Milosevic of “willful killing of civilians”
>
Not the case with the US war action. Great care was taken during the bombing
campaign to minimize civilian Iraqi war casualties.
>
>, “extensive destruction
> of property not justified by military necessity”
>
This is a judgment call, and not all judgments are perfect, especially when obscured
by the fog of war, and when one is aware that one's adversary will hide anything
anywhere.
>
>, “wanton destruction of
> cities, towns or villages
>
This also cannot be claimed of the US attack. Residential areas were not specifically
targeted.
>
>, or devastation not justified by military
> necessity”
>
This is, once again, a judgment call lacking the 20/20 benefit of hindsight but not
permitting the risk to one's own forces of mistaken forbearance.
>
> and “attacks on undefended towns or buildings”
>
If there are military supplies in an undefended building in the heart of a hostile
nation, it is eminently reasonable to destroy them. If an undefended town is helping
to manufacture or store materiel for the war effort, it is eminently reasonable to attack
the sites where such manufacture or storage are occuring.
>
>which ratifies the
> validity of at least some of the charges that could be made. Naturally,
> Saddam Hussein should be charged in the same way for his attacks on the
> Kurds, as should the Turkish and Iranian governments. But if justice is to
> be done (rather than using the courts as an additional weapon), the US
> Presidents, and senior staff and military personnel would have to share the
> dock for US actions against Iraq.
>
As I have answered the above charges point by point, the hysterically biased j'accuse
may be placed in the unfavorable light it richly deserves.
> [hr]
> [Hermit 3] Iraq didn't stand a chance. Everybody knew it. Including Iraq.
>
> [Joe Dees 6] In which case only a madman wouldn't pull out of the conquered
> territory unilaterally.
>
> [Hermit 6] I would suggest that Joe Dees has failed to refute the above. In
> particular, from a general military perspective, his assertion makes no
> sense. If an attack is inevitable, it makes perfect sense to attempt to
> blunt its thrust in enemy territory rather than upon your own terrain. Also,
> when your destruction seems assured, you may choose to fight to the death
> rather than surrender.
>
No; if the reason that the adversary is contemplating *counter*attack is because you
have occupied a neighboring country, to withdraw unilaterally from that country
removes the rationale for the contemplated expulsion. If you are not going to be able
to hold onto conquered territory logic demands that you vacate it.
>
> [Hermit 6] More telling and to the point, despite the above, as I have
> previously shown
> [url=http://www.consortiumnews.com/archive/colin11.html]Behind Colin
> Powell's Legend: Dodging Peace[/url], Iraq did offer a unilateral
> withdrawal, and had in fact accepted the seven day withdrawal negotiated in
> Moscow, when Bush changed this to “24 hours” and ordered the attack to
> begin. In addition, I draw your attention to (my emphasis):
> [GWT p5-6]
> [quote]Brown’s assessment is supported by the experience of a surviving
> Iraqi officer: “We were anxious to withdraw, to end the mad adventure, when
> Saddam announced withdrawal within 24 hours—though without any formal
> agreement with the allies to ensure the safety of the retreating forces. We
> understood that he wanted the allies to wipe us out: [I][b]he had already
> withdrawn the Republican Guard to safety[/b][/I]…. Brigadier General Scales,
> director of the U.S. Army’s Desert Storm Study Project, reports that “by
> March 1, Republican Guard armored and mechanized units had reached as far
> north as al-Quarnah, almost 100 kilometers north of Basra… [b][I]To have
> reached so far north on the 1st , the Guard armor had to have moved into
> Basra on the 27th , if not the 26th” [/b][/I]. In other words, by the 28
> February ceasefire, there was little organized Iraqi resistance south of
> Basra. Units and individual soldiers that continued to escape were no longer
> combat effective, and the surviving Republican Guards had escaped before
> Basra could have been captured.[/quote]
> [hr]
In other words, Saddam wanted his worthless troops to die while pulling out the
valued ones, to gain maximum sympathy in the Muslim community while minimizing
his military losses, and this is why he did not move them ALL out? Or could it be that
the RG's were a second line of homeland defence? Nevertheless, we DID surround
the retreating Republican Guards, and let them pass, tanks and all - a huge and
horrendous mistake. We should've let the WALK back.
>
> [HJS 6] Joe Dees argued that the US “permitted” the escape of some of the
> Republican Guard. validly stressing very valid US concerns about Iran’s
> intentions, and asserting that the US “permitted” some of the Iraq troops
> and equipment to escape because of this. Hermit then proved that the US had
> forced Iraq into the fight when Iraq was prepared to retreat without
> fighting.
>
They had six months in which to retreat, and did not. If we had delayed, I have no
doubt that forces would have remained until we kicked them out, as we did. Saddam
is not only psychopathic, aggrandizing, megalomanic and bloodthirsty, he is a proven
liar. If you are reduced to basing your position on reports on what saddam Hussein
is purported to have promised, you your position is reduced to nothing.
>
> [Joe Dees 6] If they were unwilling to defend their conquest, they shouldn't
> have taken Kuwait in the first place.
>
> [Hermit 6] The logical consequent to this acknowledgement by Joe Dees is
> that “if” the Iraqi were unwilling to defend their conquest, then they were
> not the belligerents, which he has portrayed them as being. As I have
> clearly shown that they did not wish to “defend their conquest” [supra] they
> clearly were not the belligerents. Thus my argument is carried that the US
> and her allies were indeed the primary belligerents. This contradicts Joe
> Dees’ assertions in all directions, and appears to undermine if not
> invalidate practically all of his responses, which were coherent and have
> not already invalidated. In addition, as the mandate from the UN was to
> restore Kuwait, this offer to retreat by Iraq should have ended the UN
> mandated action against Iraq, casting the later action into a somewhat
> precarious legal limbo.
>
In fact, Hermit rather conveniently forgets an unconveniently unforgettable fact; Iraq
invaded and conquered Kuwait in the first place, and formally annexed it. This
irretrieveably brands Iraq as the belliegerents, and the coalition as those who
restored sovereignty to an invaded and conquered and formally assimilated country.
In fact, if there had not been a credible threat of expelling counterattack, and I
believe, if there had not been actual action, we would be left with a 'Greater Iraq' that
could have contained much more than Kuwait.
>
> [Joe Dees 6] The fact that we let four divisions of Iraq's elite Republican
> Guards ride out in their remaining tanks was one of the most horrendous
> mistakes we made during the conduct of that campaign. This commentator
> claims that letting them go did not make a difference with the Shiites and
> Kurds, but he documents that we DID let them go.
>
> [Hermit 6] Having read the article which is in fact cited here as GWT it is
> clear that this was not a decision, but an effect of the “fog of war” and
> that rather than letting “four divisions of Iraq's elite Republican Guards
> ride out in their remaining tanks” the US failed to trap them. I’d add that
> only 50% of Iraq’s tanks, and just over four divisions. So there was no
> question of “let” here.
>
We failed to trap them by design; we forbore to close the pncers. I also point out that
this citation puts the clear lie to your assertion that NO Republican Guard forces
were in a capturable or destroyable forward position.
>
> [GWT p5-6][quote]Mr. Richard M. Swain, author of the history of Third Army
> in Desert Storm published by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff
> College, agrees with General Franks. He believes that if the ground
> offensive had been allowed to continue, “more Iraqis might have been killed,
> but it seems unlikely that any major formations would have been cut
> off”.[/quote]
> [hr]
>
I place more credibility in my citation, and in the reports I remember viewing and
reading during the war itself.
>
> [HJS 6] Joe Dees had previously claimed that rather than employing the
> soldiers that he mistakenly thought had been “let go” by the US, that Saddam
> Hussein used those divisions to “slaughter minority citizens” in both the
> north and south of his own country until the US prevented this. Hermit
> requested additional details and was provided a series of links investigated
> below.
>
> [Hermit 6] Before responding to the links, I draw your attention to all the
> rebuttal needed:
>
> [GWT p14]
> [quote] Anticipating internal unrest, Saddam Hussein hedged his bets by
> keeping the bulk of his army out of the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO).
> At the eve of the ground offensive, only 26 divisions were inside the KTO
> while 42 divisions were in reserve. Units in central reserve included a
> mechanized division, a Republican Guards motorized
> division, and the Iraqi helicopter fleet. These forces were more than
> adequate to deal with unsupported uprisings that “appeared to lack the
> organization, unity, and power deemed necessary to topple a weakened but
> still entrenched dictatorship”. As Defense Intelligence Agency historian
> Brian Shellum put it: “Well-led soldiers with rifles in
> trucks—and Saddam had plenty of those—would have been enough in the end to
> do the job.”
>
> [Hermit 6] Also notes that this again strongly supports the fact that Iraq
> had no aggressive intentions towards its other neighbors – at least until
> the US stepped in. Reserve troops are not an immediate threat.
>
Baghdad itself is less than three hundred miles north of the kuwaiti border; any
'reserve' troops in the south of Iraq could have been driven in their trucks and tanks
to the front quickly. And whatever chances the minority forces had against truckloads
of armed soldiers, they had vastly less chance against armored tank divisions.
>
> [Joe Dees 6] Cites [url] http://www.island.lk/2001/12/24/featur02.html[/url]
>
> [Hermit 6] Wonders if Joe Dees read that article and quotes:
> [quote]Mr. Hussein, by contrast, is a secular state builder whose loyalty is
> to himself. In his modernization campaign, he has allowed drinking of
> alcohol in public and freedom in women’s dress. He has used ruthlessness,
> cunning and expansionism to exterminate his enemies in his quest to
> physically and intellectually homogenize a diverse population and mold Iraq
> into the most powerful nation-state in the Arab world.[/quote]
>
> [Hermit 6] Wonders why Joe Dees disapproves – and quotes some more:
> [quote] When Shiites in the south revolted after the 1991 gulf war, Mr.
> Hussein sent in his elite Republican Guards, who strafed crowds, doused the
> wounded with gasoline and set them on fire and publicly hanged captives as a
> lesson to would-be plotters.[/quote]
>
> [Hermit 6] Let’s look at [GWT] for a military perspective.
>
> [GWT p23]
> [quote]The U.S. attempted to achieve its desired end state by encouraging a
> coup by the Iraqi military or Ba’ath party. Instead, we encouraged Kurds and
> Shiites to rebel against Saddam. According to Bob Woodward, during an 3
> August 1990 National Security Council meeting, President Bush “ordered the
> CIA to begin planing for a covert operation
> that would destabilize the regime and, he hoped, remove Saddam from power.
> He wanted an all-fronts effort to strangle the Iraqi economy, support
> anti-Saddam resistance groups inside or outside Iraq, and look for
> alternative leaders…” By mid-August, “Bush signed a top-secret intelligence
> ‘finding’ authorizing CIA covert actions to
> overthrow Saddam”.[/quote]
>
> [Hermit 6] Notes that the US actions were illegal under under International
> law and under US law at the time.
>
> [GWT p30]
> [quote]Brent Scowcroft, dismayed at charges that President Bush provoked,
> then abandoned, the uprisings answers: “It is true that we hoped Saddam
> would be toppled. But we never thought that could be done by anyone outside
> the military and never tried to incite the general population. It is
> stretching the point to imagine that a routine speech in Washington would
> have gotten to Iraqi malcontents and have been the motivation for the
> subsequent action of the Shiites and Kurds.”14 According to the rebels, it
> wasn’t a stretch. One told a New York Times reporter: “Bush said that we
> should rebel against Saddam. We rebelled against Saddam, but where is
> Bush?”15 “It was not unreasonable to read the president’s previous call for
> Saddam Hussein’s overthrow as a pledge of American support and protection,
> and his subsequent stance of non-intervention as a betrayal of that pledge.
> Shivering on their bleak mountaintops, and dying at a rate of one to two
> thousand a day, every Kurd interviewed by the western media thought
> so.”[/quote]
>
> [GWT p15]
> [quote]The uprisings were doomed to fail without U.S. support. Unfortunately
> for the rebels, neither the U.S. nor its coalition partners wanted them to
> succeed.[/quote]
>
> [Hermit 6] Notes that this seems to have been another “error” on the part of
> the US.
>
It is indeed a sad and tragic consequence of a fecklessly broken promise i formly
beleve that we made to the Iraqi resistance, one that everyone involved may pay
dearly for, but that can still be rectified, at greater cost the longer we delay.
>
> [GWT p22]
> [quote] In 1991 Iran played a role in making propaganda and it provided
> weapons to some Iraqi rebel groups, particularly to the Badr Brigade… The
> Brigade was composed of Iraqi Shi’is recruited from among refugees expelled
> to Iran by the Baath in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and it appears that
> several thousand of the entered Iraq a few days after the insurrection had
> started. In training and arming these refugees, Iran demonstrated the
> continuity of its traditional aspirations to gain leverage over Iraq by
> influencing Shi’i affairs in the country.[/quote]
>
> [Hermit 6] Notes that here we have fundamentalism and external interference
> and insurrection and terrorism all at once.
>
> [GWT p14]
> [quote] Following the initial outburst against Saddam and violence directed
> at local authority, the rebellions turned to anarchy. “Refugees fleeing
> south continued to report ‘chaotic conditions’ in the towns under rebel
> control.[/quote]
>
> [Hermit 6] And that this resulted in serious internal disturbance.
>
> [Hermit 6] Quite a story. It seems that the “fault” lies partway between the
> US and Iran. And that Saddam Hussein, vicious methods or not, was putting
> down an externally assisted, highly illegal, insurrection. If this were
> Sharon or Putin, the US would be cheering him on. Why the difference in
> approach? Actually, using CIS action in Chechnya as a yardstick, Saddam
> Hussein’s response was very mild. But the CIS is our “friend” in the war
> against terror. Do I understand what Joe Dees is saying correctly? Just as
> the deaths of 2000 or so Afghan civilians was merely collateral in
> suppressing the evils of terrorism? USA GOOD! IRAQ BAD! Is that the extent
> of the argument?
>
Our error was in not assisting the Iraqi insurrection until it deposed a criminal regime
that has shown no compunction whatsoever about occupying its neighbors, gassing
and bombing its own people, and attempting to assassinate foreign leaders, then
rebuilding the country and arranging for free and fair elections. Since we committed
that error, we were not as good as we should have been, for the sake of people both
outside and inside iraq, but there can be no doubt in the ratonal and intellectually
honest mind that Saddam Hussein's regime is VERY bad, and in fact, evil, if evil can
be measured in savage actions and intentions. OTOH, since you mention Chechnya,
its Islamic guerillas were trained and financed by Al Quaeda and Osama Bin Laden.
>
> [Joe Dees 6] [url]http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~irdp/ref/ref02.html[/url]
>
> [Hermit 6] A lengthy bibliography with no links or content. It speaks to
> nothing.
>
> [Joe Dees 6]
> [url]http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2001/Winter/s&d2-w01.html]
>
> [Hermit 6] A brutal critique of the RMA together with the only paragraph
> mentioning the Kurds:
> [quote]Let us look more closely at the Gulf War. The failure of the flanking
> maneuver to close the ring on the Republican Guards clearly reflected a
> failure of operational art and leadership at senior command levels, which
> greatly impacted the war’s strategic outcome. Also, at the level of
> political-military decision making, a series of errors compounded this
> failure. The premature halt of the ground war for ill-considered public
> relations reasons, the signaling of the U.S. intent to withdraw from Iraq
> without a quid pro quo, the abandonment of the Kurds and Shiites, and more
> generally, the obvious absence of any serious planning for the war’s
> endgame—all helped turn a stunning feat of arms into something considerably
> less than a strategic victory[/quote]
>
> [Hermit 6] Notice how this source conflicts with [GWT], with both
> Schartzkopf’s and Powell’s memoirs, and official state utterances and
> records. Not the most valuable reference cited and one that does not speak
> to the question at all.
>
In other words, you don't like it, so you dismiss it without replying to it, even though it
was critical of US (in)action; the boo-hooray theory in full flower.
>
> [Joe Dees 6] [url]
> http://www.metimes.com/2K/issue2000-31/reg/iraqi_kurd_warns.htm[/url]
>
> [Hermit 6] Here we have an article about external sponsorship (illegal) of
> internal insurrection (illegal), anarchy and tribal fighting and a vast
> amount of really wishful thinking. It also demonstrates that the reaction
> against the Kurds was due to externally sponsored insurrection and thus
> legitimate in sense if not in scale. Exactly the opposite of what Joe Dees
> is attempting to prove. I will quote just a few lines:
> [quote]Iraq's restive Kurds rose up against Baghdad during the Gulf War, but
> an offensive by government troops forced hundreds of thousands of Kurds to
> flee through the mountains. Kurdish peshemergas backed by allied air power
> later succeeded in wresting the area from Baghdad's grip. Intermittent
> fighting which then broke out between the PUK and the rival Kurdistan
> Democratic Party (KDP) of Massoud Barzani culminated in 1996 when the KDP,
> backed by Baghdad's forces, overran Talabani's capital, Sulaymaniya.
> AUS-brokered cease-fire followed in 1997. Western diplomats said they had
> warned the feuding Kurds they would not come to their aid if they persisted
> in their internecine war.… He said Shiite rebels in the south of Iraq would
> also seize the opportunity of unrest in the Kurdish areas to step up their
> struggle against the Iraqi.[/quote]
>
> [Hermit 6] I begin to wonder how many Kurds were killed by other Kurds
> rather than by Bagdad.
>
One of the reasons that we did not continue to support the Kurds was this very
internecine warfare; some Kurds sided with and were supplied by Iran, while the ones
we were ostensibly with, after tasting Saddam's brutality and US reluctance,
unwisely decided to trust him and side with him against their fellow Kurds. We
should have attempted covert negotiations to unite the factions and then supported a
united front. One also wonders if the Iranian initiative was intended from the first to
throw a monkey in the US works by splitting the Kurdish resistance.
>
> [Joe Dees 6] [url]http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9609/04/iraq.chronology/[/url]
>
> [Hermit 6] Yet another sorry saga. Nothing supporting Joe Dees position, but
> a report which makes it clear that the US communicated poorly and then beat
> up the Iraqis who appeared to have stuck to the letter of the agreement. But
> it sure helps build a picture of the Kurds.
> [quote]But the Kurds, themselves, helped set off the latest conflict. The
> 3.5 million Kurds are split into two main factions. And this has provided
> Iran and Iraq -- themselves long-standing enemies -- with a way to wage a
> proxy war against one another. On August 17, both Kurdish factions clashed
> along the Iraq-Iran border. Iranian artillery fired in support of the
> Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, led by Jalal Talbani. By the following
> Thursday, the opposing faction, Massoud Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic
> Party, cast its lot with Saddam, its old enemy. "The Kurdistan Democratic
> Party then made a strategic blunder by inviting the Iraqis to enter Kurdish
> territory to attack PUK forces," said U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry.
> "Our intelligence disclosed an Iraqi military buildup under way more than a
> week ago. [/quote]
>
> [Hermit 6] The degree of misunderstanding, ineptitude and total violation of
> sovereignty is very clear in this article. I hope that Joe Dees’ support of
> my argument is unintentional.
>
We decided not to stand behind this house divided against itself, when we should
have endeavored to unite the wings by reminding them of their opposition to their
common enemy, Saddam. We were able to do so with the fractious factions of the
Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.
>
> [Joe Dees 6]
> [url]http://www.comebackalive.com/df/dplaces/iraq/index.htm[/url]
>
> [Hermit 6] I don’t know what is happening here. One of us is confused. This
> is a humor site taking pokes at both Saddam Hussein and the USA in gay
> abandon. The last line is a hoot – and if true, lines Ms Madeleine Albright
> up in the dock with the rest of the US leadership:
> [quote] Madeleine Albright declared in March 1997 that economic sanctions
> against Iraq would remain as long as Saddam stays in power. The sanctions
> have decimated the Iraqi people.[/quote]
>
I will set out the logic behind such a position, and why it is rapidly becoming a
nonalternative, in another post.
>
> [Hermit 6] Other bits are not so funny,
> [quote] What did the United States do? Responded with operation Desert Fox.
> Who thinks up these names? For four days in December 1998, U.S. and British
> planes blasted the hell out of Iraq. Targeting 97 sites throughout Iraq, the
> United States unleashed 325 Tomahawk missiles, 90 cruise missiles and quite
> a few B-52s. And with what result? Er, nothing actually. The UN is out,
> Saddam is in and the media had a field day. Oh, and the Arab world got very
> upset. Then for good measure this year, Saddam has violated the no-fly zones
> 110 times by sending a few rusty MiG-23s into the air and targeted USAF
> planes flying over Iraq 190 times using radar lock on. In 11 weeks between
> February and March the United States and Britain dropped 274 bombs on 105
> targets. The United States says that 25 percent of Iraq's air defense system
> in the no-fly zone has been destroyed. In all, a grand total of 1,100 bombs
> have been dropped on 359 different targets over Iraq in the first 8 months
> of 1999. But Saddam's not flapping.[/quote]
>
> [Hermit 6] Omitted here is the fact that this was again mainly
> infrastructure and civilians that were pasted, but I really cannot imagine
> why Joe Dees cited it? To increase the length of his citation list? Now
> comes one which Joe quotes from:
>
Actually, villages are frequently found around radar sites and antiaircraft batteries,
but it has been the batteries and sites themselves, niot the villages, that have been
the targets of US and British bombs.
>
> [Joe Dees 6] [url]http://www.kke.gr/cpg/solid/iraq/iraq_3.html[/url]
> [quote]In kurdistan, the north of Iraq, the Kurdish people who are the
> second biggest nationality in the multi-national Iraqi state, have been
> subjected to a systematic Arab chauvinistic policy coupled with horrific
> atrocities against them. As an example, 4500 villages were razed to the
> ground in Kurdistan; 190000 Kurdish civilians were rounded up in 1988 and
> deported to the south and then killed; many of them were buried alive in
> mass graves. Chemical weapons were used several times against Kurdish
> villages. In one of the worst acts of genocide, the town of Halabja was
> bombed in 1988 with poison gas and 5000 of its inhabitants perished in 3
> minutes.[/quote]
>
> [Hermit 6] Reads it and blinks. Why, I spoke about that town. It’s
> celebrated. It is one of those that is claimed to provide indubitable proof
> of chemical warfare use – but whose? Please, read carefully. “In one of the
> worst acts of genocide, the town of Halabja was bombed in 1988 with poison
> gas and 5000 of its inhabitants perished in 3 minutes.”
> [Hermit 6] This is not true. None of it is "true" in the sense of accurate
> or believable:
>
> [Hermit 6] It is the worst act of genocide that I am sure has solid evidence
> behind it. Not “one of the worst.”
>
> [Hermit 6] It was bombed in 1988 – after Iranian armed Kurds revolted and
> while the city was occupied by Iranian troops.
>
> [Hermit 6] Yes, in a population of 70,000, 5,000 died – or a 7% death toll.
>
And if they did it 15 times?
>
> Or if you prefer, 5,000 out of [b]20[/b] million (Yeah, I know Joe says 30
> million, but the UN and the Kurds are claiming 20 million. I can’t explain
> it at this time) or a mortality of 0.25 per 100,000. Compare that to the
> 16.4 per 100,000 Americans who die in traffic accidents each year. This of
> course supports my assertions about the inefficiency of chemical weapons.
>
Next, you'll be saying something along those lines about the WTC atrocity, and how
our response against Al Quaeda is unjustified, because we are big enough to simply
absorb all the slaughter they deal out to us.
>
> [Hermit 6] Yes, poison gas certainly seems to have been used, but the only
> reliable accounts I have been able to locate (see below) report that many
> (perhaps most IMO) of the fatalities apparently died of bomblets from
> cluster bombs – just like the JSOW used by the US all over Iraq – not from
> poisoning. Those dying of gas died of Cyanide or possibly Tabun. Remember
> Jimmy Lee Gray? How about Donald Eugene Harding? Try
> [url]http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/botched.html[/url] for a reminder. Even
> in a small cell with a massive overload of gas, death seldom occurs in 3
> minutes. Those exposed to Mustard gas were burnt or blinded. Meanwhile,
> this must surely qualify as the longest 3 minutes ever, as eyewitness
> reports claim that the Iraqi bombing continued for two days – possibly three
> and at least 17 raids.
>
Nerve agents act that quickly.
>
> [Hermit 6] Of course this is all a little hard to fathom out, and it gets
> worse:
> [quote] back at the time of the Halabja bombing in 1988, the declared view
> of the United States was that the city had been poisoned by the Iranians.
> Remember, at that time, Iran had been our official enemy and Iraq the
> unofficial but definite friend. Sen. Claiborne Pell, D-R.I., convinced by
> staff reports to the Foreign Relations Committee that tactics of
> extermination were being employed in Iraqi Kurdistan, introduced the
> Prevention of Genocide Act in the Senate, but decisive pressure was employed
> by the Reagan administration to get the measure killed. Nizar Hamdoon, then
> Saddam's ambassador in Washington, was one of the most favored diplomats in
> the city, freely reaping licenses and trade deals from every commercial
> department and even earning the prized certificate of "moderate" from the
> bulletin of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.[/quote] [url]
> http://www.salon.com/col/hitc/1998/03/nc_02hitc2.html[/url] As late as 1990
> it was still chalked up to the Iranians. Patrick E. Tyler, Iran Faulted,
> Too, in Gas Attack on Kurds, in International Herald Tribune, May 4, 1990.
>
Yep, we were slow on the uptake, but when Iraq invaded kuwait, we finally got the
picture.
>
> [Hermit 6] Ah those swings and roundabouts and the vicissitudes of fate. I
> recommend to your attention [url]
> http://www.casi.org.uk/discuss/2002/msg00034.html [/url] and cite:
> [quote] The source for most of these "exposes" of Halabja was a report
> entitled 'Iraqi power and US security in the Middle East' by Stephen
> Pelletiere (trained in politics, also claims Iran was behind the 1991
> intifada in Southern Iraq), ret. Colonel Douglas V. Johnson (trained in
> strategic studies) and Leif Rosenberger (trained in economics). It was
> published by the US Army War College - not usually a source that campaigners
> take as providing the gospel truth. I mention the authors' academic
> background only in order to point out that none of them (to my knowledge)
> are trained in chemistry or medical diagnostics. As far as I'm aware, the
> IHT piece of 1990 was just referring to this study (though I haven't seen
> that article directly). The work only makes brief mention of Halabja, and
> then only assertively (no evidence is offered). On page 52 of the book it is
> simply written: "In March 1988, the Kurds at Halabjah were bombarded with
> chemical weapons, producing a great many deaths. Photographs of the Kurdish
> victims were widely disseminated in the international media. Iraq was blamed
> for the Halabjah attack, even though it was subsequently brought out that
> Iran too had used chemicals in this operation, and it seemed likely that it
> was the Iranian bombardment that had actually killed the Kurds."… the focus
> of their study is not on Halabja, human rights in Iraq or international
> welfare, but is indicated by the title of the study, "US security in the
> Middle East". Straight after making their claim on Halabja, the authors
> detail what they mean by "US security in the Middle East": “As a result of
> the outcome of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq is now the most powerful state in the
> Persian Gulf, an area in which we have vital interests. To maintain an
> uninterrupted flow of oil from the Gulf to the West, we need to develop good
> working relations with all of the Gulf states, and particularly with Iraq,
> the strongest." (p.53) This is two sentences after their take on Halabja.
> Human rights organisations' attempts to penalise Iraq are "without
> sufficient thought for the adverse diplomatic effects" (p.53). Again, p.57:
> "under pressure from the Iraqis, all the Arab states of the Gulf - with the
> possible exception of Oman - would tacitly support a move to withdraw US
> privilieges in the Gulf" - and so Iraq needs to be kept on side, lest "US
> privileges" be withdrawn. The sole evidential material provided is that the
> photos of Kurdish victims showed blue discoloration of extremities, and this
> was an indication of use of a cyanide compound, most probably hydrogen
> cyanide or its derivatives ("blood gas"); since it was claimed that Iraq did
> not make use of hydrogen cyanide, someone else must have done it. Therefore
> (the argument goes), it must have been Iran. This is coupled with a claim
> that since Halabja was only recently captured by the Iranian-backed
> Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, there was probably an Iranian mix-up and the
> Iranians ended up bombing their own side. The problems with this argument
> are numerous. Most obviously, why on earth would Iran bomb a town so
> extensively whose inhabitants were among the core supporters of their ally,
> the PUK? The argument of "fog of war" fails to hold, even if the Iranian air
> force had thought that Iraqi troops were still present in Halabja.
> Even that seems unlikely: the PUK captured Halabja on 15 March 1988. They
> were accompanied by members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard who
> coordinated PUK actions. The town was fully under PUK/Iranian control 4
> hours after they entered the town. The eyewitness testimony collected by
> Physicians for Human Rights and by British filmmaker Gwynne Roberts, who was
> in Halabja & captured the attack and aftermath on film, confirms this: the
> PUK controlled all exits to the town, and were preventing civilians from
> leaving as they thought that the Iraqis would not spread their artillery
> bombardment of surrounding areas to the centre of the town if it was fully
> inhabited (human shields). I find it hard to believe that with Iranian
> troops in the town for 36 hours before the chemical weapons attacks, the
> field commanders still thought that Iraqi forces
> were still in possession of the town.
> The actual attack began at nightfall on the 16th, when 8 aircraft dropped
> chemical bombs; they were followed throughout the night by 14 aircraft
> sorties, with 7 to 8 planes in each group. Intermittent bombardment
> continued until the 18th (some reports say the morning of the 19th). If
> the Johnson et al argument is to be believed, Iranians were bombing their
> own elite units and key supporters for 48 hours, even though news reports
> were already circulating about the defeat of Iraqi troops on the 15th.
> Regarding the nature of the CWs used - the crucial element in Johnson's
> analysis - the most detail survey of the medical effects was done by
> Professor Christine Gosden, a medical geneticist from Liverpool Uni, who has
> (I think) done the only survey into the long-term effects of the CW attack
> (obvious access problems until recently). From looking at the health
> problems of those who were victims of the attacks on Halabja, her results
> show that mustard gas, sarin, tabun and VX were used in the attack.
> Prior UN investigations had catalogued Iraqi use of Tabun and mustard gas
> from 1983, but ongoing into the later stages of the war (see in particular
> the specialist report of the UN Sec-Gen of 26/3/84, and the UN expert
> commission report on use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war doc no.
> S/18852 of 1988). Iraqi use of sarin and VX has been widely asserted (the
> former, by the Physicians for Human Rights in soil sampling from Birjinni:
> [url]http://www.phrusa.org/research/chemical.html[/url]). So it seems quite
> clear that all the chemical agents that Gosden traces the use of at Halabja
> had been used previously by Iraq.
> By contrast, I have seen no reliable analysis of Iranian use of either Tabun
> or Hydrogen Cyanide - Dr Johnson doesn't tell us that he has any such
> evidence either: all he says is that there was no previous use of cyanide
> from the Iraqi side, and infers from this that it must have been the
> Iranians. By contrast, the presence of cyanide which Dr Johnson claims (but
> is still disputed; the claim stems primarily from Iranian autopsies on
> victims I believe, but are not independently confirmed) is perfectly
> explicable in terms of Iraqi use of Tabun. Gosden says: "The Halabja attack
> involved multiple chemical agents -- including mustard gas, and the nerve
> agents SARIN, TABUN and VX. Some sources report that cyanide was also used.
> It may be that an impure form of TABUN, which has a cyanide residue,
> released the cyanide compound."
> ([url]http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1998_hr/s980422-cg.htm[/url]; reposted
> in a better format at:
> [url]http://www.chem-bio.com/resource/gosden.html[/url])
> The only credible report that Johnson himself cites in his defence, a PhD
> from Syracuse University in 1993 - rather than supporting Johnson's case -
> shows that the decomposition of the chemical agent, Tabun (which Iraq did
> use) produces a cyanide compound. Iraq didn't need to use hydrogen cyanide
> directly in order to produce blue discoloration around mouths. Its
> established repertoire of chemicals did that as well.[/quote]
>
> [Hermit 6] So did Joe Dees make his case? He didn’t even address it. And the
> one and only source he has quoted that speaks to the argument is indubitably
> beyond belief.
>
Once again, nerve agents kill rapidly, and the gist is that it was the iraqis, not the
Iranians, who launched the attack.
> [hr]
> [HJS 6] Joe Dees submitted that Saddam Hussein is “worse” than Israel,
> without providing evidence, and suggested that the Kurds had done “nothing
> back.” Hermit suggested that the 20 million odd Kurds should be offered the
> opportunity to move to a series of village states. Joe Dees responded:
>
> [Joe Dees 6] 30 million. And I would approve of them having a homeland in
> their traditional area where Iraq, Iran and Turkey meet.
>
> [Hermit 6] Notes that I am finding the problem of 10 million virtual Kurds
> difficult to figure out. I don't know what Joe Dees' source is. I have
> addressed the problems of forcing nations to provide a “homeland” for the
> Kurds, and suggest that only an American who has not learnt about the Balkan
> issues and does not know the first thing about tribal society could make
> such a daft suggestion. All of the evidence, including that provided above
> by Joe Dees points to the fact that this in not a nation, not even a nation
> in the making, but an assortment of tribes – just like Afghanistan. To throw
> them all in one basket, surrounded by enemies that need the water they will
> be camped on, is to guarantee a new “Balkan” or even Israeli situation.
>
> [Hermit 6] The idea that this might somehow work out sounds to me like the
> dream of a cockeyed optimist on crack.
>
Allowing them to stew in their own juices, under the control of three other not-too-
friendly-with-each-other-nations, who promise them things to get them to engage in
proxy wars, then slaughter them when they ask that the promises be kept, while
killing the other uppity ones from time to time is no solution; is that your alternative
>
> [HJS 6] Joe Dees apologized for not breaking International law more
> thoroughly on behalf of the Kurds and Hermit suggested that this was not a
> good place for a homeland.
>
The best place for a homeland is always at home.
>
> [Joe Dees 6] Not without international support and diplomacy to ease the
> friction with the neighbors who would be required to cede territory for the
> formation of their state. It's a hard road, but the alternative of leaving
> them twisting in the wind is not a long-term viable option. the Kurds aren't
> going to go away simply because others find their existence inconvenient.
>
> [Hermit 6] And Joe Dees had the cheek to suggest that I was gullible!
> [hr]
>
And where does Hermit think all those millions of Kurds are gonna go?
>
> [HJS 6] Hermit observed that US intervention seldom resulted in the expected
> results and that the US appears to be working for the CIS these days. Joe
> Dees disagreed, and damned the Chechnyans. Hermit responded with a damning
> report on the FSB and the fact that they were undoubtedly behind the Moscow
> bombings as part of a strategy to place Putin in the Presidency. Joe Dees
> replied:
>
> [Joe Dees 6] Considering the credibility problems of the
> Russian-mob-connected Berezovsky, I would view any damning reports from his
> underlings concerning his arch-enemy putin with a mine of salt. There were
> several bombings some of which MIGHT have Putinprints on them, but the mass
> kidnappings did not; some of the definitely Chechnyan perpetrators were
> killed.
>
> [Hermit 6] Notes that Joe Dees is again confused. Litvinenko (the author of
> work cited above, and already infamous for exposing FSB involvement in
> informal “political executions”) worked for Putin, not Berezovsky. And while
> the “mass kidnappings” may have had Chechnyan involvement (very likely as
> kidnapping is a “traditional” Chechnyan occupation), they occurred after the
> CIS had reopened the war on Chechnya and was engaged in genocide and the
> “obliteration” of their cities – to the warm support of the United States.
> [hr]
>
Therer have been organized guerilla and terrorist groups operating in the area for
quite some time (Dagestan, Ingushetia, Ossetia, Georgia, in fact, the entire region);
this is the second time that Chechnya has flared up in recent years. Their ties with Al
Quaeda have been heavily substantiated.
>
> [HJS 6] Hermit commented on the huge lack of visible success in taking the
> war to the Taliban and Al Q’aeda and the harm done to citizens.
>
> [Joe Dees 6] We have captured a thousand Al Quaeda and Taliban members, and
> our bombing campaigns against their massed troops and fortified front lines
> surely took out many thousands more. Over a thousand were killed in the
> battle for Mazar-I-Sharif alone.
>
> [Hermit 6] Joe Dees, it seems, like many others, cannot believe how little
> damage devastating bombing does to well dispersed, dug in troops. Having
> engaged in these operations, and noted their lack of success I suggest Joe
> Dees perform more research into effective kill zones. It took the Soviets
> train carriages worth of ammunition to kill single Mujahedin fighters. I
> seen no reason to imagine that capitalist bombs have a greater PoK than
> soviet bombs. The very small death and capture toll reflecting under 10% of
> the total expected seems proof positive that the Taliban and Al Q’aeda have
> faded into the hills – exactly as I predicted, and the fact that the US is
> blaming everyone else for their disappearance suggests that they cannot find
> them. Also as predicted. A moments inattention, and I predict that like a
> ghostly, but deadly band of raggle-taggle-gypsies, they will reappear. Given
> the exceptionally small haul of arms found to date, I would also suggest
> that they are well supplied with weapons.
> [hr]
>
Actually, we were able to target them much better than the Soviets could; our bombe
are entire levels more precise, and we had ground targeters painting targets with
lasers as well as high resolution satellites pinpointing troop concentrations. Most of
the Al-Quaeda are most likely either out of the country or dead, as the native Afghans
for the most part resented and despised them.
>
> [HJS 6] Hermit commented on the old-new communist government put into place
> in Afghanistan by the same General who occupied the Kosova airport ahead of
> NATO just a few years ago, and mentioned the “old” communist Afghan leader,
> Rashid Dostum.
>
> [Joe Dees 6] Now there's a brute I'd just as soon see kept as far away from
> the halls of power and influence as possible. They threw him the smallest
> bone they thought he'd settle for, with his appointment as *deputy* defence
> minister.
>
> [Hermit 6] Who we have given the job of running the army on a day to day
> basis. Confirmation of who is really managing the circus, I would have
> thought.
>
I dinna think so, and you know no different. He only commands the loyalty of
Uzbeks; if he makes a wrong move, it will not get him far.
>
> [hr]
> [HJS 6] Whom Hermit mentioned had not lost his delicate touch with prisoners
> – only aided by US forces instead of Soviets….
>
> [Joe Dees 6] Those prisoners smuggled weapons into the compound and staged a
> bloody revolt.
>
> [Hermit 6] Just after the US had announced that they wanted no prisoners.
> Convenient. The only problem with this plan was that it hit the headlines
> too early. It is happening all over Afghanistan.
>
Taliban and Al Quaeda surrendered at Konduz, then smuggled small arms into the
Mazar-I Sharif compound in their turbans. It's all in Jonathen Walker's interview.
>
> [hr]
> [HJS 6] And mentioned that this "old communist" had threatened his way back
> into power supporting the “young communists” who pushed one of the few
> “Islamic moderates” out of the way…
>
> [Joe Dees 6] Rabbani's former rule was so lawless and corrupt that it
> provided the opening for the rise and success of the Taliban in the first
> place. The Afghan people, by and large, have no fond memories of him and no
> reason to respect him.
>
> [Hermit 6] Unfortunately without even token “Islamic” presence I suspect
> that every village has an imam quietly teaching sedition against the new
> godless government. And when the euphoria is over, and the reality of a
> brutal life in a brutal environment begins to bite again, or a Taliban comes
> a visiting, the people will go back to their god, Imam and will follow
> whoever threatens them more nearly.
> [hr]
> [HJS 6] Hermit notes that the Pushtun others have spoken of as a “sell-out”,
> Hamid Karzai, does not represent the Pushtun in any way shape or form, is
> now prime minister – and wonders how long that holiday will last.
>
As long as he brings the bacon back to Afghanistan, that bacon being aid/assistance,
he'll be there (but maybe not for longer than the six months he is slated to lead the
interim government for). Whomever is chosen to lead them then - and I'll bet it will
be Hamid Karzai - will have loya jirga support. As far as him being a sell-out, that's
supposedly a national pastime there, but considering that he led the Pashtun
insurrection that aided in toppling the southern Taliban, he obviously commands a
good deal of loyalty.
>
> [Joe Dees 6] Actually, I tend to think that he is one of the few that does
> indeed place the interests of his country over his own. He risked his ass
> in Taliban-controlled areas attempting to consolidate resistance just like
> Abdul Haq did; Haq just lost his, which shows how dangerous such a mission
> was, and how many cojones he must've had to carry it out. He has asked for a
> multinational police force to come in, disarm the warlords, and extend the
> rule of law outside Kabul, but so far, the US has refused his request. I
> hope that this is not the first sign that we are repeating our former
> walking-away mistakes there.
>
> [Hermit 6] Notes Joe Dees’ optimism, but suggests that Hamid Karzai knows
> that cops who are not attached to one tribe or another are his one chance of
> long-term survival. The odds are that he is hated by everyone and will be
> blamed for anything and everything that goes wrong. Hermit further notices
> that it is not just him. The entire “transitional” government is asking the
> same.
> [quote] “The top U.N. envoy to Afghanistan told the Security Council on
> Wednesday that the country's new government, ordinary Afghans and even
> warlords are demanding an expansion of the multinational force now in the
> capital - and he urged the council to say yes. Lakhdar Brahimi said recent
> clashes in eastern and northern Afghanistan and flare-ups elsewhere have
> instilled fear in the population ``that peace will not last.'' They
> demonstrate how fragile security is two months after U.S.-backed forces
> routed the former Taliban rulers.[/quote]
> [url]http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,1280,-1501850,00.html[/url
>
A multinational force with teeth that will disarm the lawless outlying areas is indeed
sorely needed.
>
> [hr]
> [HJS 6] Hermit notes that 40% of the country are now unrepresented.
>
> [Joe Dees 6] One of the reasons for that is the fear that Pashtuns would be
> sympathetic to and shielding of the Taliban, who were, like their leader
> Omar, predominately Pashtun, and got their start in Pashtun Kandahar.
>
> [Hermit 6] Wonders why he is not amazed to hear somebody as ardently in
> favor of democracy as Joe Dees sometimes sounds, justifying why it won’t
> work. Its at times like these I really admire the US constitutionalists –
> and come closest to despairing over its future.
> [hr]
The people I am referring to are not great democrats; it is my hope that such values
may be somehow instilled in them. And Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, is
himself Pashtun.
>
> [HJS 6] Hermit notes the very strange demography of the “transitional”
> government, and notes that Afghans are beginning to notice the same.
>
> [Joe Dees 6] Well, the Northern Alliance won; but do not forget that this is
> an interim government, and a loya jirga is already in the works. Hamid
> Karzai has made it clear that if selected by them he would continue as
> president until democratic elections could be held, but if they chose
> someone else, he would gracefully accept their authority and leave his
> appointed post. I think that they're damned lucky to have him.
>
> [Hermit 6] Thinks this paragraph speaks for itself.
>
It sure does. You'd prefer maybe Dostum or Rabbani?
>
> [hr]
> [Hermit 2] In short, we now have a communist-dominated regime, ruled by a
> king
>
> [Joe Dees 6] Karzai is no king.
>
> [Hermit 2] whose strings are pulled by Moscow
>
> [Hermit 6] Looks meaningfully in the direction of Zahir Shah and wonders if
> Joe knows how a loya jirga is run… and if he is keeping up with the news.
> Hermit suggests that Joe Dees ask President Bush II why the composition of
> the US Supreme Court is critical to ensure the right answer to an election
> and that Joe Dees familiarize himself with the name Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The
> Afghan Islamic Press quoted him as saying the loya jirga won't be a solution
> to any of Afghanistan's problems, and complaining that the representatives
> were imposed by outsiders. The US is trying to get him expelled from Iran.
>
He's a piece of work, all right, and the US is warning Iran not to try to use him as a
proxy destabilizer. He shares most of the Taliban's social positions.
>
> [url]http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,1280,-1501850,00.html[/url
> Hermit admires the interesting way in which “democracy” ends up meaning
> whatever one wants it to and the way that even quite intelligent people seem
> capable of persuading themselves that their opponent won’t recognize or
> won’t object to a stacked deck. I guess, some think that if it works in
> America it will work anywhere. The trouble with this theory is that in
> Afghanistan (like most of Africa) there is no television to tell people what
> to think. Instead, people, who do have brains, who always have agendas, and
> who don’t necessarily share your objectives, probably don’t share your
> objectives even, carry the news from place to place. And there is no way to
> determine who they are,
>
Voting worked before the '50's elsewhere; they DO have radio there, and TV in the
villages. People are sure to gather round the electronic hearth and consider what
they can glean there. They should be able to glean, and discuss, quite a lot, since
freedom of speech rights have recently been restored to Afghanistan.
>
> [Joe Dees 6] Russia is acting responsibly in the situation; the US has no
> complaints with their participation. They seem to be genuinely endeavoring
> to help rather than to extend puppet state status to Afghanistan. This
> ain't your old communist USSR, don't forget.
>
> [Hermit 6] Of course the CIS is helping. The CIS temporarily “owns”
> Afghanistan -to the extent that it can be safely owned anyway.
>
> [Hermit 6] It is not the “old communist USSR,” they have learnt a lot. Mr.
> Putin has even learnt that if you call it the “repression of terrorism”,
> that you can engage in genocide and America will help, and that with any
> luck, if they don’t mind sharing the strings, that America might even pay to
> keep Afghanistan under their control. Perhaps it is the US that has changed
> more than Moscow. We now openly support brutal repression and the flaunting
> of International law, rather than looking for stooges to engage in it on our
> behalf.
>
>From what Orwellian through-the-looking-glass universe do you hail? The flaunting of
international law took the form of Al Quaeda terror flyers hijacking planes full of
cliueless civilians and crashing them into skysceapers filled with other clueless
civilians like them; the brutal repression was perpetuated upon the people of
Afghanistan, men and women, by the Taliban. They turned their soccer stadium into
a killing field, and executed people for teaching women. They beat women who let
an ankle show or who accidentally laughed, and anyone who dared to listen to music.
Talk about fucking rePRESSion!!!
>
> [HJS] Hermit observes that that it “will take quite a while for the full
> fruits of this exercise to become visible.”
>
> [Joe Dees 6] I think that the outcome will surprise you as much as the quick
> deposition of the Taliban did.
>
> [Hermit 6] Do you think I am surprised? It is worth remembering that (as I
> pointed out long before we started bombing Afghanistan) that it took the
> Soviets less than a week to capture Kabul last time around, and ten years of
> bleeding to decide that it wasn’t worth owning the rest of it due to the
> huge cost and negative world reaction. They are presumably hoping that this
> time it will stay bought as rather than complaining, the rest of the world
> will cheer them on as they kill enough freedom-fighters, oh sorry,
> “terrorists” to keep it under control.
>
Just who are you calling freedom fighters? The Taliban? And whose freedom were
they fighting for? They were archetypical OPPRESSORS/DENIERS of freedom, and
even a blind squirrel would have a hard time missing that nut, but not the hermit. Or
are you calling the Al Quaeda, who wish to establish global sharia law, freedom
fighters? Obviously, you are failing to check with reality here.
>
> But somewhere in Afghanistan are
> 40,000 plus Taliban and some 5,000 plus Al’Quaeda. And anywhere outside a
> few major concentration points is a no-go zone – for us or our new
> government. And anyone with military sense knows it. Especially the new
> government, which is why they are asking for troops. What most Afghans
> haven’t realized yet, but Mr. Putin and the “new-old” government does, and
> is angling for, is that the troops they are asking for are not going to
> arrive from NATO, instead, eventually, the world is going to pay to position
> conscripts from the border states of the CIS there. No wonder the bear is
> smiling.
>
That's a future i would not like to see, mainly because of the mutual antipathy
between Afghans and the old USSR; I do not think that the US wishes it, either. I'm
betting on NATO or UN troops, probably the latter, or even troops from moderate
Islamic nations, most likely Turkey (which also fits with the first two alternatives).
>
> [Hermit 3] Right now, it is visibly a severe political defeat for American
> ambitions to use Afghanistan as a gateway to Central Asian oil and gas, and
> while the "evil" Taliban is gone, the Communists are in power in Kabul
>
> [Joe Dees 6] I think that Afghanistan would welcome such industry and the
> jobs and money it would provide. as for the 'communists', I guess you
> forgot that they're a democracy now, and performing a facilitative, not a
> commanding, role. If it looks like it's gonna change, the US would be the
> first to honk the horn, and it hasn't happened yet.
>
> [Hermit 6] It would be well to study some geography – and some history too,
> while you are about it. The Soviet Union always was a democracy. And the US
> was and is not a democracy, but a Republic.
>
One-party systems where one has to belong to the party to vote are not democracies.
And the 'R' in USSR stands for Republic.
>
> [Hermit 3] the south of Afghanistan is in chaos
>
> [Joe Dees 6] It's being progressively sorted out; impatient, are we? Is it
> part of the MTV generation thingie?
>
> [Hermit 6] No. I am not impatient. And while impatience might well be an
> “MTV thingie” the premature assumption of having achieved ones goals is more
> likely to be one. I am the one saying “wait”, before you make a noise,
> evaluate whether your goals have been met and determine whether what you see
> matches what you are being told. You have been told that Afghanistan is
> under control. But the Pushtun South is still in chaos, the Taliban are not
> “defeated” only waiting, there is still “evil” in the world, along with tens
> of thousands of terrorists and a certain Mr. Bin Laden.
>
>From every silver lining, hermit will spin a cloud.
>
> [Hermit 3] Pakistan is isolated and unloved by all
>
> [Joe Dees 6] Musharraf is beginning to realize that he can't condemn some
> terrorists and fund others. I believe that his beginning of a turnaround
> will continue and that it'll be the best thing that has happened to his
> country in a long time.
>
> [Hermit 6] If he lasts that long. India is impatient.
>
It's a situation that bears watching, but the initial signs are favorable.
>
> [Hermit 3] Washington has spent $10 billion to date (and a lot more to come
> if we keep our word)
>
> [Joe Dees 6] And I hope we do; the WTC atrocity cost easily a dozen times
> that.
>
> [Hermit 6] Hope is such a forlorn thing in comparison to history. When it
> comes to making predictions, I prefer history. And history shows that the US
> prefers others to pay for her “mistakes” – and she has her own economic
> troubles these days, or hadn’t you noticed?
>
And does not want to leave a base from which more 'economic troubles' might be
launched.
>
> [Hermit 3] and Mssrs Vladimir Putin and Ariel Sharon are happily killing
> their own "terrorists".
>
> [Joe Dees 6] The term does not deserve qualifying quotes when applied to the
> suicide bombers and machine-gunners of massed civilians.
>
> [Hermit 6] Ask the missing population of Chechnya – if you can find them.
> After all, their cities have been demolished. Or ask the missing population
> of the Palestine – remember there are 6 million Palestinians sitting around
> as “Displaced Persons” in other Arab countries. And Mr. Arafat has just told
> them that they won’t be going home. In contrast to International law, the
> Israelis won’t let them. And the US is going along with that. In any case,
> every Israeli, man and woman, from 18 to 55, is a soldier. Does a soldier
> count as a civilian when wearing civilian clothes? Meanwhile the
> Palestinians left in the Palestine are not soldiers. They are disarmed
> civilians, herded into 20% to 30% of a country that once was theirs,
> embargoed and blockaded, regularly attacked by ground attack fighters,
> helicopters and tanks, helpfully paid for or provided to Israel by the US
> government. In both cases, the quotations are deserved.
>
Oh, exCUUUUUSE me; I was under the impression that those suicide bombings and
machine-gunnings of Israelis that happens almost daily was perpetrated by ARMED
Palestinians! Obviously, the li'l Palestinian david's must be tossing bullets at the big,
bad Israeli goliaths with slingshots! And what are the Israelis attacking? "Security
installations" where the snipers/palestinian authoriti police run to hide, "legitimate
factories" busy turning out mortars, and "innocent civilians" who are in the business
of wiring up the faithful to blow themselves to paradise.
>
> [Hermit 3] How much of this helps to fight "evil", prevent further attacks
> on the US, avenge 911, or indeed to achieve any other stated US aim is yet
> to be explained.
>
> [Joe Dees 6] A lot; the milatary chief, Atef, among at least five of the top
> 24, is dead, the Base's base has been lost, and its surviving hierarchy are
> too busy running and hiding to plan catastrophic attacks in the US.
>
> [Hermit 6] They have lost a few people. Yes. But what makes you think that
> terrorists have an hierarchical command structure and are dependent on a
> base? Even CNN has mentioned that this is not the case, so by now even most
> Americans should have grasped the fact.
> [hr]
>
There still has to be a few people who are aware of a majority of the cells; we are
particularly interested in Zubadayev (sp.?)
>
> [HJS] Joe Dees argued that preventing possible but unlikely conversion of
> desperately needed water purification and sewage processing equipment into
> chemical weapons that might (no matter how unlikely) be used against the US,
> was and is more important than the thousands of children dying a day because
> the US destroyed the infrastructure needed to sustain civilian health in
> Iraq not once, but twice over. I am not going to summarize the following as
> nobody will believe it.
>
Not just the US, but Saddam's own citizens and those of neighboring nations.
>
> [Hermit 2] A slippery slope argument from you? The fact that this decision
> [Hermit 6: Not to allow access to water purification equipment] results
> directly in the death of hundreds of thousands of children does not bother
> you at all? You agree with the immortal words of Madeleine Albright when she
> told CBS in 1996 that containing Iraq was worth the death of 500,000 Iraqi
> children? [url]http://home.att.net/~drew.hamre/docAlb.htm[/url]
>
> [Joe Dees 3] It might sound heartless and cruel, but we are facing a
> heartless and cruel adversary; better theirs than mine, and they are
> actively seeking to reify the second alternative.
>
> [Hermit 3] If they are reciprocating, it is difficult to blame them.
>
I just want to prevent Saddam from doing what he so badly wants to do to us, by all
means necessary and sufficient.
>
> [Joe Dees 6] The WTC attack came BEFORE we went after the perpetrators; if
> anything, WE are reciprocating, so i guess you can hardly blame us, ayy?
>
> [Hermit 6] 500,000 plus dead Iraqi children, a million plus dead Iraqi
> adults. This was between 1990 and 2001, but is continuing. 3,000 plus dead
> Americans on 2001-09-11. I think Joe Dees has before and after mixed up – as
> well as scale – as well as having provided the most compelling reason I have
> heard to date why sympathy is wasted on Utic Americans.
>
I think that you are intentionally mixing unrelated things (Iraq and Afghanistan)
purposefully here to cover your own lacunae. Osama Bin Laden did not attack the
US because of Iraq; JAYZUS!, he offered his mujaheddin to Saudi Arabia in a jihad
AGAINST Iraq in the Gulf War (they wisely rebuffed him and requested US
assistance instead). He also did not attack us because of the Palestinian issue,
which he had not mentioned until he thought he could gain some sympathy from it in
1997. His most concentrated gripe is that the soles of infidel shoes dared to soil the
sacred soil of Saudi arabia, the nation housing the holiest shrines of Islam. And his
more general gripe is that nonmuslims not only exist, but are not under the
dhimmitude of good Muslims and sharia law. These issues caanot be negotiated with
him.
> [hr]
> [HJS] Hermit argues for the rule of law, and the same law for everyone,
> including the US, in a public court so that justice can be seen to be done.
>
And that would be sharia law, the only kind that certain parties would accept, judged
by accredited mullahs?
>
> [Joe Dees 6] Or giving homicidal nobodies a chance to make a public name for
> themselves whilst they preach their cause in the media, like we did with Bin
> Laden himself. The difference is that he had money; a lot of fanatics would
> give their lives to take out a bunch of infidels, and the chance, if they
> survive, to denounce the hated and despised unbelievers on a soapbox for all
> their fundie droogies to hear, applaud and aspire to is just gravy to them.
> [hr]
> [Hermit 6] I watch the arguments put forward by Joe Dees, who above argued
> why democracy won’t work,
>
I never argued that democracy wouldn't work, only that it takes time for people who
have lived their lives under religious hegemony, tribal semi-anarchy, fascist military
juntas, or weird combinations of the above, to learn enough about what it is to make it
work.
>
> then argued that deliberately killing children is
> acceptable,
>
That's Saddam's position; release me to kill you are I'll let them die.
>
>and now argues that the institution of law is counterproductive,
>
If it is the same, fair law, not hermit's version.
>
> and wonder why I am wasting my time… I very much doubt that anybody else
> agrees with this kind of argument anyway.
>
> [Hermit 6] Which is why I will end this rebuttal here, despite the fact that
> with a single exception, I have already done the work to rebut, no
> devastate, Joe Dees' self-contradictory arguments. But in fact they don't
> need rebuttal. It should be quite clear to anyone that if we hold ourselves
> unaccountable to anyone, consider that no harm we do to others is
> unjustifiable if we think that some threat might exist, and if we use
> different rules for ourselves than we demand of others, then we are not
> being just, we will create united opposition to ourselves and when our
> society self-destructs, history will not be kind to us.
>
We have been for some time now the single strongest force for democracy,
egalitarianism, freedom of religion, speech and self-determination, and the forces of
progress and modernity in the world. We remain so. If such people as Bin Laden
and Saddam Hussein were indeed to wield the global power that the US presently
possesses, the world would be such a hellhole that, from that parallel dystopia, the
definition of utopia would be here.
>
> [Hermit 6] Fortunately, the above perspective is far from typical, even in
> the United States.
>
In the US, many perspectives are allowed, unlike in Iraq and, until recently,
Afghanistan.
>
> [Hermit 6] The single issue which remains open is that of Nuclear
> proliferation. I have not yet finished my research on that. And seeing that
> I am currently working through the "Doomsday Clock" site, I think I will
> finish this letter with a quote from one of its editors, Eugene Rabinowitz.
> [quote]But American leadership--particularly the administration of Lyndon B.
> Johnson--had not been up to the task. The great U.S. failure of the 1960s,
> said Rabinowitch, was not so much a "sin of commission"--the Vietnam War--as
> a "sin of omission," a failure to use American power and wealth in
> imaginative ways to lead a worldwide mobilization of technical, economic,
> and intellectual resources for the building of a viable world community.
> "The day of reckoning may be approaching, not in the form of American
> withdrawal and communist takeover in the Far East, but in a wave of world
> hunger, and the accompanying surge of world
> anarchy."[/quote][url]http://www.thebulletin.org/clock.html[/url]
>
> [Hermit 6] I argue that this is still true today, and that the arguments
> made by Joe Dees are symptomatic of the mindset that created that earlier
> failure, a failure of the imagination and a wilful rejection of the lessons
> of history.
>
I will address the Nuclear problem in another post, as I maintain that it is the single
overriding and irrefuteable consideration logically entailing that we MUST topple
Saddam Hussein while we can do so conventionally, without finding ourselves
obliged to engage in a nuclear response to a nuclear attack.
>
> Regards
>
> Hermit
>
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