From: joedees@bellsouth.net
Date: Wed Jul 24 2002 - 21:56:06 MDT
On 24 Jul 2002 at 21:19, Hermit wrote:
>
> Joe, it might have been kind to the congregation to note that statements about the nature of truths are relative to a quasi absolute (no matter how poorly defined) theoretical metaconstruct (the map). Statements about observations (the terrain) are relative to the observer (from a particular
perspective). Thus these two kinds of statements, while seemingly congruent, are members of completely different classes of objects, are qualitatively different and attempting to compare them is utterly invalid.
>
> Which, of course, would have dealt with Rhinoceros' confusion on this issue.
>
> As we see, it is not too difficult to neutralize the arguments which Fish so signally failed to address - but from what we saw here, it appears that Fish could not develop an argument that would get him a drink in a brewery.
>
> Regards
>
> Hermit
>
Truth-statements must be internally consistent (not self-contradictory),
externally coherent (not contradict adjacent truths) and referentially
correspondent (as abstract maps, or signs, they must indeed faithfully
address or point to or refer to or represent a concrete terrain or object).
nagel strongly makes the case that the statement "everything is
subjective) fails on the first count, and existential/hermeneutic
phenomenology, with its concept of intersubjectivity, makes the point
that such a statement fails on the third. While statements within an
axiomatic system are relative to each other in the sense of mutual
foundedness and contiguity, the system as a whole which the totality of
such statements constructs must be taken as the objective referent for
any of the statements of which it is comprised to possess either
meaning or reference. They must also be relative to the referent to
which they point, i.e. the described lived-world of experience, which is
itself apodictically primordial and a priori to any statements about it. In
fact, the very property of 'aboutness' which is critical to the identity of a
statement qua statement is that which establishes is as derivative; i.e.
in a state of existential dependence upon the world which it purports to
describe. That world itself cannot be said to be dependent upon
anything for its existence, just dependent upon our perception of it for
its appearance to us.
>
> ----
> This message was posted by Hermit to the Virus 2002 board on Church of Virus BBS.
> <http://virus.lucifer.com/bbs/index.php?board=51;action=display;threadid=25785>
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