From: joedees@bellsouth.net
Date: Fri Aug 16 2002 - 22:54:38 MDT
David C. Isby
The nuclear threat is back. Saddam Hussein is projected to have a
nuclear capability by 2005; he may use it not for deterrence but
rather detonations. This is driving current U.S. policy toward Iraq.
But the nuclear threat to U.S. security is not limited to Saddam or
even the "axis of evil" committed to developing nuclear weapons
and missiles to deliver them. Elsewhere, the risks of an India-
Pakistan nuclear conflict go far beyond the damage it could do to
the peoples of the subcontinent. The threat is not limited to those
being targeted.
The United States has an interest in maintaining the de facto taboo
on nuclear use that has emerged and endured since Nagasaki.
While the weapons of modern states (and terrorists) can inflict
painful losses, only nuclear weapons can today reliably threaten
large-scale devastation. It is in the interest of the United States to
see that nuclear weapons are as rare as possible and that they
remain unused.
Conventional threats, however elusive or difficult, can be
addressed conventionally. To maintain the nuclear firebreak, the
United States has not currently pursued nuclear weapons options
for war-fighting rather than deterrence. The United States has left
designs for nuclear weapons designed to counteract difficult
targets ” hardened and deeply buried installations or incoming
ballistic missiles with countermeasures ” in research and
development. To maintain the taboo, the United States does not
have a declaratory strategy of using nuclear weapons against those
that conduct a biological weapons attack against our forces.
Unless deterrence appears assured, better to let aggressors deal
with uncertainty.
However, Saddam may try and have his nuclear use in the end ”
if not as aggressor, then as target. Testimony in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee hearing on July 31 projected that a desperate
Saddam might launch his residual ballistic missile force at Israel
with biological weapon payloads in an attempt to provoke an
apocalyptic retaliation, leaving any democratic Iraqi successor
with ashes, bitterness and radioactivity. Defeated dictators in their
final bunker are not deterrable; they want to take their populations
with them. American policy is aimed at preventing them from
having the opportunity.
The United States ” not just professional strategists ” needs to
think about how the world will change if ” or when ” the
nuclear taboo is broken, whether by Iraqis, Israelis, terrorists or an
India-Pakistan conflict. A return to business as usual is unlikely to
be a viable policy option once the nuclear genie has been released.
Will we be able to maintain nuclear non-proliferation as a viable
policy goal? This may be especially difficult if nuclear use is seen
to be "successful." The United States will need to help ensure that
it is in position in the next few years to counter a post-nuclear
rush toward proliferation. We are unlikely to have the luxury of
time to put together a response after nuclear weapons are used.
Will nuclear use make nuclear war-fighting more thinkable and
hence make U.S. nuclear weapons vital for more than deterring
potential future rivalries from Russia and China? The United
States, following the most recent round of strategic arms
reduction with Russia, wants to keep considerable numbers of
nuclear warheads in storage rather than destroying them. This may
be a way of reconciling the goal of a reduced U.S.-Russian
strategic nuclear balance while still retaining enough nuclear
weapons to overawe potential competitors. The United States will
likely need to develop a broad spectrum of new policies to
maintain the viability of the current goal of limiting nuclear
proliferation, if the utility of nuclear weapons has been
demonstrated by combat use.
The United States today uses the spectrum of policy tools ”
bilateral and multilateral ” to show potential nuclear
proliferators that they will have less, rather than more, security if
they build a nuclear capability. The 1994 agreement with North
Korea was intended to apply this approach to that member of the
"axis of evil." Saddam has seemingly rejected any approach short
of the use of force to check his nuclear ambitions. It is certainly in
the U.S. interest that nuclear weapons be limited, but also that
they remain unused. For, if they are used, among the many things
the United States will have to build afresh is a new approach to
counter nuclear proliferation. That means we will have to have the
tools ” conceptual as well as actual ” ready in advance.
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